Vendor Breach Containment: Making Integrations Safe Even When They Get Popped

Illustration of a secure front door and multiple vendor side doors, one compromised.

Vendor breaches are no longer an edge case—they are a primary way attackers bypass your “front door” controls. A single compromised integration can turn into wholesale data access if it relies on long-lived tokens, broad permissions, unmanaged exports, or direct database connectivity. This post turns the “side doors” risk into an actionable containment checklist: minimize what vendors can reach, shorten how long access works, and reduce the value of anything that leaks. You will find practical patterns—an integration gateway, curated exports, kill switches, and tight token scopes—that make stolen vendor access boring and keep blast radius small.

Sharding to Contain the Blast Radius of Data Breaches

Modern SaaS platforms sit on top of massive, multi-tenant data stores. When those stores are breached, the damage is rarely limited to a single record; it is often “wholesale” compromise of large slices of the user base. For a CISO or CTO, this is the critical risk: not that a record can be stolen, but that everything a given system knows becomes available in one incident.

When SaaS Fails, It Fails at Scale: Why Data-in-Use Protection Matters

Cloud and SaaS have become the default place to store and process sensitive data. They have also become the default place to lose it. Recent years have seen the same pattern repeat: a single weakness in a cloud platform, data-warehouse service, or widely used SaaS component is exploited once, and data for many organisations and […]

Protecting Data-In-Use in the Cloud: A Pragmatic Philosophy

Executive Summary: In modern cloud environments, protecting data-in-use (data actively processed in memory) is critical. If an adversary can read or dump your system’s memory, they can steal session tokens, encryption keys, or other credentials that let them impersonate legitimate users. In fact, infostealing malware that exfiltrates session cookies can “bypass password and 2FA controls” and give attackers […]